Bank Stress Situation?

Banking stress watch — November 21, 2026

Unverified cash-run reports

The November 16 banking outage is confirmed. The subsequent claim of a nationwide run on physical cash is not independently verified. But the distinction matters enormously for your Minsky framework: a technical failure can become a liquidity problem if it destroys depositor confidence.

What we can establish

Claim Evidence
Five or more major banks experienced problems Monday Confirmed customer complaints, but not five independent bank failures
Chase was the principal source Confirmed. JPMorgan attributed transaction delays to an internal software bug
Chase branches could not process some transactions Confirmed Monday. Some in-person banking was disrupted
Branches began running out of currency Wednesday Not independently verified
Banks imposed widespread cash withdrawal restrictions Not independently verified
A nationwide cash run is underway Not established

Reuters reported November 16 that JPMorgan identified an internal software defect, denied evidence of a cyberattack, and said customers retained access to their funds.

Reuters

By Monday evening, Chase said transactions were processing normally. AP subsequently reported that the problem had been resolved and that other banks’ apparent outages largely reflected transaction dependencies involving Chase.

NBC Los Angeles+1

What interests me about Martenson’s claim

There is a meaningful difference between a bank refusing a withdrawal because of insufficient liquidity and a branch being unable to provide an unusually large amount of physical currency immediately.

Branches maintain limited cash inventories. Large withdrawals may require advance notice even when the bank is financially sound.

However, multiple geographically dispersed branches unexpectedly exhausting cash inventories would be a materially different signal, especially if accompanied by withdrawal restrictions extending beyond ordinary branch procedures.

That is the evidence I would want from Martenson: branch locations, dates, requested amounts, whether withdrawals were refused or merely delayed, and whether customers could obtain funds through alternative channels.

The Minsky transmission mechanism

Hypothetical confidence-to-liquidity cascade

Technical banking outage

Observed November 16

Depositors increase withdrawals

Not yet verified nationally

Banks replace deposits with more expensive funding

Conditional scenario

Liquidity pressure, asset sales and credit tightening

Potential systemic transmission

For your regional-bank shorts, including PNC, CFR and SBCF, the more consequential development would be persistent deposit outflows, rising wholesale funding dependence, deteriorating deposit pricing or evidence of forced securities sales.

A physical-currency shortage at individual branches would not by itself establish any of those conditions.

My assessment

Martenson’s reported field observations deserve investigation, not dismissal. But there is currently a substantial evidentiary gap between Monday’s verified operational disruption and Saturday’s suggestion of a nationwide quiet bank run.

The decisive test is whether cash-access difficulties continued after Chase restored its transaction systems. If independent reports confirm geographically widespread withdrawal restrictions on Wednesday through Friday, that would materially strengthen the case for an emerging confidence event.

Do you have the original Martenson video or post? I’d particularly like to establish whether his branch reports identify actual locations and withdrawal amounts.

RW: He says he is getting antidotal reports from “people”.

That clarifies the evidentiary quality considerably. Martenson is relying on anecdotal reports from his audience, not independently verified banking data.

That doesn’t make the reports false, but it introduces several problems:

  • Selection bias: People experiencing difficulties are more likely to contact him than customers withdrawing cash normally.

  • No denominator: Ten reports from ten branches would mean something very different from ten reports across thousands of branches.

  • Ambiguous restrictions: A branch requiring advance notice for a $25,000 withdrawal is not equivalent to a bank refusing to return deposits.

  • Possible amplification: Several people may be repeating the same original incident.

What interests me is whether the reports are geographically dispersed and whether customers are encountering new restrictions on ordinary withdrawals, rather than longstanding cash-handling procedures.

For our Minsky watch, I’d classify this as:

Unverified early-warning signal — insufficient evidence of systemic deposit flight.

The November 16 outage is a plausible trigger for anxiety, but causation remains unproven.

I would give considerably more weight to corroborated reports of unusually large cash orders, sustained deposit transfers, rising bank funding costs or emergency borrowing.

And there’s an important distinction: a run on physical currency is not necessarily a run on bank deposits. Customers moving money electronically to Treasury bills or money-market funds could produce much greater funding pressure without a single branch running out of cash.

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