🇺🇸 Chase branches are running out of cash. Banks are limiting withdrawals. And it started right after 5 major banks went down on Monday.
Dr. Chris Martenson, founder of Peak Prosperity, says people figured it out on their own.
By Wednesday, he was getting reports from the field: banks won’t let me take out that much. Branches are running low. A quiet run on cash across the country.
People aren’t waiting to be told. They’re already moving.
@chrismartenson
— Mario Nawfal (@MarioNawfal) November 20, 2026
Banking stress watch — November 21, 2026
The November 16 banking outage is confirmed. The subsequent claim of a nationwide run on physical cash is not independently verified. But the distinction matters enormously for your Minsky framework: a technical failure can become a liquidity problem if it destroys depositor confidence.
What we can establish
| Claim | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Five or more major banks experienced problems Monday | Confirmed customer complaints, but not five independent bank failures |
| Chase was the principal source | Confirmed. JPMorgan attributed transaction delays to an internal software bug |
| Chase branches could not process some transactions | Confirmed Monday. Some in-person banking was disrupted |
| Branches began running out of currency Wednesday | Not independently verified |
| Banks imposed widespread cash withdrawal restrictions | Not independently verified |
| A nationwide cash run is underway | Not established |
Reuters reported November 16 that JPMorgan identified an internal software defect, denied evidence of a cyberattack, and said customers retained access to their funds.
Reuters
By Monday evening, Chase said transactions were processing normally. AP subsequently reported that the problem had been resolved and that other banks’ apparent outages largely reflected transaction dependencies involving Chase.
NBC Los Angeles+1
What interests me about Martenson’s claim
There is a meaningful difference between a bank refusing a withdrawal because of insufficient liquidity and a branch being unable to provide an unusually large amount of physical currency immediately.
Branches maintain limited cash inventories. Large withdrawals may require advance notice even when the bank is financially sound.
However, multiple geographically dispersed branches unexpectedly exhausting cash inventories would be a materially different signal, especially if accompanied by withdrawal restrictions extending beyond ordinary branch procedures.
That is the evidence I would want from Martenson: branch locations, dates, requested amounts, whether withdrawals were refused or merely delayed, and whether customers could obtain funds through alternative channels.
The Minsky transmission mechanism
Hypothetical confidence-to-liquidity cascade
Technical banking outage
Observed November 16
Depositors increase withdrawals
Not yet verified nationally
Banks replace deposits with more expensive funding
Conditional scenario
Liquidity pressure, asset sales and credit tightening
Potential systemic transmission
For your regional-bank shorts, including PNC, CFR and SBCF, the more consequential development would be persistent deposit outflows, rising wholesale funding dependence, deteriorating deposit pricing or evidence of forced securities sales.
A physical-currency shortage at individual branches would not by itself establish any of those conditions.
My assessment
Martenson’s reported field observations deserve investigation, not dismissal. But there is currently a substantial evidentiary gap between Monday’s verified operational disruption and Saturday’s suggestion of a nationwide quiet bank run.
The decisive test is whether cash-access difficulties continued after Chase restored its transaction systems. If independent reports confirm geographically widespread withdrawal restrictions on Wednesday through Friday, that would materially strengthen the case for an emerging confidence event.
Do you have the original Martenson video or post? I’d particularly like to establish whether his branch reports identify actual locations and withdrawal amounts.
RW: He says he is getting antidotal reports from “people”.
That clarifies the evidentiary quality considerably. Martenson is relying on anecdotal reports from his audience, not independently verified banking data.
That doesn’t make the reports false, but it introduces several problems:
-
Selection bias: People experiencing difficulties are more likely to contact him than customers withdrawing cash normally.
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No denominator: Ten reports from ten branches would mean something very different from ten reports across thousands of branches.
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Ambiguous restrictions: A branch requiring advance notice for a $25,000 withdrawal is not equivalent to a bank refusing to return deposits.
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Possible amplification: Several people may be repeating the same original incident.
What interests me is whether the reports are geographically dispersed and whether customers are encountering new restrictions on ordinary withdrawals, rather than longstanding cash-handling procedures.
For our Minsky watch, I’d classify this as:
Unverified early-warning signal — insufficient evidence of systemic deposit flight.
The November 16 outage is a plausible trigger for anxiety, but causation remains unproven.
I would give considerably more weight to corroborated reports of unusually large cash orders, sustained deposit transfers, rising bank funding costs or emergency borrowing.
And there’s an important distinction: a run on physical currency is not necessarily a run on bank deposits. Customers moving money electronically to Treasury bills or money-market funds could produce much greater funding pressure without a single branch running out of cash.
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